神戸大学附属図書館デジタルアーカイブ
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https://doi.org/10.24546/81000024
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2024-04-26
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81000024 (fulltext)
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81000024
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open access
出版タイプ
Version of Record
タイトル
規範カスケードにおける評判政治(中の四)
キハン カスケード ニオケル ヒョウバン セイジ チュウノ 4
その他のタイトル
The Reputation Politics of the Norm Cascade (V)
著者
著者名
西谷, 真規子
Nishitani, Makiko
ニシタニ, マキコ
所属機関名
神戸大学大学院国際協力研究科
収録物名
国際協力論集
巻(号)
15(2)
ページ
75-113
出版者
神戸大学大学院国際協力研究科
刊行日
2007-11
公開日
2008-02-28
抄録
Although the US took a leadership during the early years of the mine regulation negotiation, it failed to win over the Ottawa Process and was forced to be in isolation in the global mine ban process. The central puzzles here are why the US as a sole superpower in the post-Cold War era was not able to lead the international landmine control and why it failed to add some amendments to the draft treaty at the Oslo Conference. Some argue that the ICBL was powerful and skillful enough to counter the US, but they didn't explain why it rejected the US rather than co-opted it. Others argue that the US failed to join the Ottawa Process until the last minute because the domestic opposition against landmine-ban defeated the pro-Ottawa opinion in the US. But such an argument doesn't explain why the US was unable to persuade participant states to support its amendment proposals at the Oslo conference. I argue instead, that the dynamics of international reputation politics played in the norm cascade, combined with the political dynamics both within the US and within the pro-ban group, gives the structural reasons for the US diplomatic failures in a systematic way. The profound domestic factor that affected the US incompetence over the landmine issue was that senior officials paid almost no attention to the issue and didn't participate in the policy-making. This lack of political leadership caused the lower officials to compromise with the military who emphasized the military utility of landmines, and to persist in being engaged in traditional arms control negotiations based on the military's preferences. The US campaign to ban landmines, on the other hand, failed to pressure the US government effectively, since it didn't sufficiently exploit the public opinion and didn't make strong connections with the military, ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), and the Department of Defense. The US was too confident of its international influence as a superpower to be alert for the changing international trend on the issue. The US was not able to set up the landmine control regime, because it failed to persuade anti-ban European allies to agree on the regulation of landmine export. In Oslo, the US was not aware of its vulnerable position in the treaty negotiation and behaved intransigently so that nobody could compromise with it. One of the structural causes of the US misperceptions was its reduced diplomatic power caused by the dynamics of international mine ban cascade. The US lost its influence and prestige in the international reputation politics which was strategically played by the ICBL. The pro-Ottawa group, on the other hand, was split on whether it should compromise with the US or exclude it. Since the ICBL coordinator Jody Williams' preference for firmly confronting the US without any compromise won over the skeptics, the pro-Ottawa group never accepted any of the US proposals and totally isolated it at the Oslo negotiation. Thus, the norm cascade and reputation politics in it made the pro-Ottawa group and the US irreconcilable enemies, and therefore, the US, who was quite insensible to the international climate of opinion, was defeated in such a hostile situation.
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国際協力研究科
国際協力論集
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15巻
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15巻2号(2007-11)
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資源タイプ
departmental bulletin paper
言語
Japanese (日本語)
ISSN
0919-8636
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NCID
AN10418744
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110006617728
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URI
http://www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/
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