神戸大学附属図書館デジタルアーカイブ
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https://doi.org/10.24546/81005016
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2024-04-20
00:19 集計
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81005016 (fulltext)
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81005016
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open access
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タイトル
東日本大震災時の国際緊急支援受入れと外務省
ヒガシニホン ダイシンサイジ ノ コクサイ キンキュウ シエン ウケイレ ト ガイムショウ
その他のタイトル
International Emergency Assistance during the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
著者
著者名
片山, 裕
Katayama, Yutaka
カタヤマ, ユタカ
所属機関名
神戸大学大学院国際協力研究科
収録物名
国際協力論集
巻(号)
20(2/3)
ページ
45-73
出版者
神戸大学大学院国際協力研究科
刊行日
2013-01
公開日
2013-05-24
抄録
This essay is comprised of two parts. The first one is the narratives by the three key government officials who were responsible for the Emergency Operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Fire Defense Agency at the initial stage just after the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred (11 March 2011). The second one is its analysis and the lessons we should learn. Various foreign governments and international agencies started to offer emergency assistance to the Government of Japan (GOJ) just after the unprecedented devastating earthquake that hit East Japan. The MOFA once decided was responsible whether to accept or not those offers and to relay them to the Cabinet Office, particularly, the C7 Division of the National Headquarter of Disaster Damage Control. Consequently, they accepted almost all the offers from those foreign governments and international agencies and tried to deliver them (emergency rescue teams and emergency goods) to the local governments in the seriously damaged areas. This coordination between supply and demand was supposed to be done by the C7 Division but was partially assumed by the MOFA itself because of the overwhelming large quantity of goods donated, and the numerous offers by other countries to dispatch rescue teams to Japan. The MOFA assigned at least one liaison officer to every rescue team to accompany and assist them as an interpreter and a coordinator. Generally, this operation was implemented successfully because of the prepared manuals and the flow chart of the operation but not so well at a certain phase because the C7 Division as well as the MOFA did not have enough information of the capacities and the qualifications of each rescue team. As a result we witnessed some mismatches between the demand and the supply. To remedy the situation, the GOJ should have invited the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team to the National Headquarter to assist the C7 Division instead of assigning it to JICA Tokyo International Center, which was located far from the National Headquarter. The UNDAC team was the most qualified and knowledgeable in terms of matching the demand and the supply (each rescue team and the damaged local areas). However, GOJ eventually failed to optimize the capacities of the UNDAC team and did not fully implement the matching function. The same is true with the delivery operation of the donated goods from abroad to the recipients in the damaged areas. The GOJ did not mobilize enough transportation to deliver them to those seriously affected people who lacked almost everything to survive during the initial days as a consequence of the gas shortage and also the disrupted traffic situation. Fortunately, in these circumstances the National Self Defense Forces, United States Forces in Japan, NGOs and the business sector showed an impressive contribution to make up for the gap between the demand and the supply. The efforts by the business sector were so visible and significant this time compared with the Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake (1995). They extended assistance to ordinary citizens who were not even their employees in the locality despite the serious damage to the manufacturing sector which resulted in the suspension of the “supply chain” of the intermediary goods worldwide for several weeks especially in the automobile industries. Further, the business sector mobilized as much human resources as well as financial resources, as possible. They were able to impress local residents who were suffering big losses from the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear power plant damages. Finally, as a solution to these kinds of situations during the occurrence of a disaster is that, we should learn most from these experiences and we should revise the Basic Act on Disaster Damage Control and its implementing plans to incorporate the significant roles of the business sector as well as NGOs. The GOJ including local authorities is not yet free from the legacies which originated in the old good days, when the public sector had enough resources to handle almost any possible situations by themselves. Time has passed quickly and the significant power shift has taken place between the public sector and the civil society in Japan. We should revise the related laws to reflect this power shift.
カテゴリ
国際協力研究科
国際協力論集
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20巻
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20巻2/3号(2013-01)
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資源タイプ
departmental bulletin paper
言語
Japanese (日本語)
ISSN
0919-8636
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AN10418744
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110009550709
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URI
http://www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/
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