神戸大学附属図書館デジタルアーカイブ
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https://doi.org/10.24546/81009197
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15
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2024-04-26
23:17 集計
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81009197 (fulltext)
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81009197
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open access
出版タイプ
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タイトル
ハズリットの『試論』における未来の自己の他者性と無私的想像力
その他のタイトル
Otherness of the Future Self and Disinterested Imagination in Hazlitt's Essay
著者
著者ID
A1105
研究者ID
1000090212224
KUID
https://kuid-rm-web.ofc.kobe-u.ac.jp/search/detail?systemId=4587d239eb42431c520e17560c007669
著者名
松家, 理恵
Matsuya, Rie
マツヤ, リエ
所属機関名
国際文化学研究科
収録物名
国際文化学研究 : 神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科紀要
巻(号)
45
ページ
69*-87*
出版者
神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科
刊行日
2015-12
公開日
2016-02-01
抄録
William Hazlitt was redeemed from obscurity only lately. An Essay on the Principles of Human Action, his first, only metaphysical book, was especially so. It was in 1995 that Martin and Baressi “found” Essay to be “the culmination of a kind of perspective on personal identity that began with Locke.” And it was not until 2005 that it received full attention from literary scholars when bicentenary essays focusing on it were published as a book titled Metaphysical Hazlitt. Reading his argument for “natural disinterestedness of the human mind” as an offspring of Hutcheson's moral philosophy, this paper aims to show how Hazlitt evolved his predecessor's philosophy of “benevolence” into a new psychological argument against the dominating school of natural selfishness of the human mind which was originated with Hobbes and Mandeville. Hazlitt refutes their idea of self as fictional, because it is based on the idea of personal identity extended to the future. According to Hazlitt, the future objects alone can be the objects of our voluntary action or pursuit, “for neither the past, nor present can be altered for the better, or worse by any efforts of the will.” (I, 1) But in fact, Hazlitt argues, there is “an absolute separation” between our present self and the future. The future self has no real existence, so we cannot mechanically have interest in our future feelings but just expect them solely by the power of “imagination.” “The imagination,” Hazlitt explains, “by means of which alone I can anticipate future objects, or be interested in them, must carry me out of myself into the feelings of others by one and the same process by which I am thrown forward as it were into my future being, and interested in it.” (I, 1-2) Thus, my future self is essentially the same as others. And it is only because we know ourselves better from the memory of our past senses and therefore anticipate our future feelings “with greater warmth of present imagination” that we tend to be more interested in our own future beings than others’. So it can be concluded that Hazlitt's discovery of otherness (or fictitiousness) of the future self gave him a firm and quite modern ground for his argument and it was the disinterested (or sympathetic) imagination that played the key role in his theory.
カテゴリ
国際文化学研究科
国際文化学研究 : 神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科紀要
>
45号(2015-12)
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資源タイプ
departmental bulletin paper
言語
Japanese (日本語)
ISSN
1340-5217
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