神戸大学附属図書館デジタルアーカイブ
入力補助
English
カテゴリ
学内刊行物
ランキング
アクセスランキング
ダウンロードランキング
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14094/90005223
このアイテムのアクセス数:
6
件
(
2024-04-19
16:45 集計
)
閲覧可能ファイル
ファイル
フォーマット
サイズ
閲覧回数
説明
90005223 (fulltext)
pdf
5.83 MB
3
メタデータ
ファイル出力
メタデータID
90005223
アクセス権
open access
出版タイプ
Version of Record
タイトル
Reciprocity and exclusion in informal financial institutions: An experimental study of rotating savings and credit associations
著者
Koike, Shimpei ; Nakamaru, Mayuko ; Otaka, Tokinao ; Shimao, Hajime ; Shimomura, Ken-Ichi ; Yamato, Takehiko
著者名
Koike, Shimpei
著者名
Nakamaru, Mayuko
著者名
Otaka, Tokinao
著者名
Shimao, Hajime
著者ID
A0434
研究者ID
1000090252527
KUID
https://kuid-rm-web.ofc.kobe-u.ac.jp/search/detail?systemId=4ef0ce8737dbe0cf520e17560c007669
著者名
Shimomura, Ken-Ichi
下村, 研一
シモムラ, ケンイチ
所属機関名
経済経営研究所
著者名
Yamato, Takehiko
収録物名
PLoS ONE
巻(号)
13(8)
ページ
e0202878-e0202878
出版者
Public Library of Science
刊行日
2018-08-29
公開日
2018-09-20
抄録
Group cooperation is fundamental to human society. The public goods game is often used to describe the difficulty of group cooperation. However, there are other structures of institutions to maintain group cooperation such as Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). ROSCAs are informal financial institutions that exist worldwide, in which all participants contribute to a common fund and take turns to receive a return. ROSCAs are common in developing countries and among migrant groups in developed countries. There are various types of ROSCAs, and they share a crucial problem in that participants whose turn to receive a return has passed have an incentive to default on their contributions. We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the mechanisms that can prevent default in a fixed ROSCA, in which the order of receipt of returns is determined before starting and is also known to members. The findings are as follows. (i) Excluding low contributors from ROSCA groups by voting increased contribution rates both before and after the receipt of returns. (ii) ROSCA members exhibited reciprocity and a sense of revenge: that is, members contributed to the returns payments of other members who had contributed to them, and did not contribute to the returns payments of non-contributors. Voluntary behaviors thus sustained ROSCAs. Meanwhile, an exogenous punishment whereby subjects were prevented from receiving returns payments unless they had themselves contributed previously did not increase contribution rates.
カテゴリ
経済経営研究所
学術雑誌論文
権利
© 2018 Koike et al.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
詳細を表示
資源タイプ
journal article
言語
English (英語)
eISSN
1932-6203
OPACで所蔵を検索
CiNiiで学外所蔵を検索
関連情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202878
ホームへ戻る