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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14094/90006167
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2024-03-29
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90006167 (fulltext)
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1.59 MB
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メタデータID
90006167
アクセス権
open access
出版タイプ
Version of Record
タイトル
Stochastic stability of dynamic user equilibrium in unidirectional networks: Weakly acyclic game approach
著者
Satsukawa, Koki ; Wada, Kentaro ; Iryo, Takamasa
著者名
Satsukawa, Koki
著者名
Wada, Kentaro
著者ID
A0943
研究者ID
1000010362758
KUID
https://kuid-rm-web.ofc.kobe-u.ac.jp/profile/ja.857e0c62395c1274520e17560c007669.html
著者名
Iryo, Takamasa
井料, 隆雅
イリョウ, タカマサ
所属機関名
工学研究科
収録物名
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
巻(号)
125
ページ
229-247
出版者
Elsevier
刊行日
2019-07
公開日
2019-07-10
抄録
The aim of this study is to analyze the stability of dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) with fixed departure times in unidirectional networks. Specifically, stochastic stability, which is the concept of stability in evolutionary dynamics subjected to stochastic effects, is herein considered. To achieve this, a new approach is developed by synthesizing the three concepts: the decomposition technique of DUE assignments, the weakly acyclic game, and the asymptotic analysis of the stationary distribution of perturbed dynamics. Specifically, we first formulate a DUE assignment as a strategic game (DUE game) that deals with atomic users. We then prove that there exists an appropriate order of assigning users for ensuring equilibrium in a unidirectional network. With this property, we establish the relationship between DUE games in unidirectional networks and weakly acyclic games. The convergence and stochastic stability of better response dynamics in the DUE games are then proved based on the theory of weakly acyclic games. Finally, we observe the properties of the convergence and stability from numerical experiments. The results show that the strict improvement of users' travel times by the applied evolutionary dynamics is important for ensuring the existence of a stochastically stable equilibrium in DUE games. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
キーワード
Dynamic user equilibrium
Nash equilibrium
Unidirectional network
Weakly acyclic games
Convergence
Stochastic stability
カテゴリ
工学研究科
学術雑誌論文
権利
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
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資源タイプ
journal article
言語
English (英語)
ISSN
0191-2615
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関連情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2019.05.015
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