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When the Revolution of 1911 broke out in China, Takashi Hara (commonly called Kei Hara) was the Home Minister of the 2nd Saionji Cabinet and one of its powerful members. Since then, while the revolution was advancing and the relations between Japan and China were gradually getting complicated through delicate variances, he sometimes criticized the government's policy toward China and sometimes participated in it, as the leader of the Seiyukai Party and also as a member of the Temporary Advisory Board on Diplomatic Affairs. Around the time when World War I was coming to an end and the Japano-Chinese relations were growing tenser and tenser, he was at the position of Prime Minister, taking the first responsibility of Japan's policy toward China. He was always at a very important position as a statesman throughout the period when the relations between the two countries came to be serious after the revolution. To grasp Hara's view of China is a subject which can not be neglected in order to clarify the history of the relations between Japan and China.

In this study I have tried to investigate what Hara thought of China as a diplomat and statesman at various stages of his growth from his young days.

I

It was in December 1883 when T. Hara was appointed consul to Tientsin that he had his first contact with China. He does not appear to have felt any particular interest in Chinese society and politics up to the time, so far as his diary and discourses are concerned. Nor was he tempted to China by his admiration for Chinese traditional culture. His relation with China began merely

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by chance when an order was given him by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Receiving the written appointment to the consulate on 26th November, he got married in a hurry and left Tokyo on 5th next month. His departure was hastened by the Annam Incident broken out between France and China.

On arriving at Shanghai he met with unexpected difficulties, the first of which was — how to go to Tientsin, the place of his appointment. No ships left for Taku, owing to the frozen Pai-ho (Pai River). The river usually began to freeze about the end of November or the beginning of December, and the navigation on it was prohibited, being dangerous, until the middle of February sometimes as late as the beginning of March. The young consul of 28 years of age was accompanied by his bride just married before departure. They stayed in Shanghai for some days, but no good idea occurred to them. Ships being unavailable, they had to go by land from Chefoo. They could at last get to Chefoo on 25th December and started for Tientsin by carriage on 30th after spending five days there.

In his Reminiscences\(^1\) Hara wrote as follows: By the word "carriage", you may imagine an ordinary one. The fact is that it was a cart with an arched tent, which was drawn by a kind of Chinese asses. Its heavy jolts were sometimes so much as to nauseate us. I know nothing about travelling in the inland of Africa, but I think there are few cases in the world as much difficult as travelling in China. ‘Indeed, we had biting cold, bad inns, and scarcely any roads to go along. We drove in the carriate straight toward the destination over hills and across rivers.’ What a honeymoon it was! Leaving inns at 2 o'clock or by 4 o'clock at latest in the morning, they hurried on the carriage till the sunset. It was not a good journey at all, for they had to enter Chihli Province across Shantung Province from Chefoo. They could at last arrive at Tientsin after sixteen days' journey at the night of 14th January the next year.

Their life in Tientsin does not appear to have been a comfortable one at all. Hara probably could not forget those hard days, so that he unusually wrote about his daily life there in details in his Reminiscences written over fifteen years later. The well water was too salty to drink. It could be utilized for bath, but if used for shampoo, it stiffened hair. The drinking water was carried from the Pai-ho, but it was colored and muddy, and not good to drink without treatments. The water had to be stirred up first with alum in it, and next, filtered after the mud having deposited at the bottom. If more caution was required, it had to be

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boiled and filtered again. The temperature was over 100 degrees in summer, while it was severely cold in winter, and moreover, they had violent winds and dusts. However, Tientsin was better than Peking, where heat and cold were much harder and its filthiness far beyond comparison with that of the settlement in Tientsin. ‘The circumstances of foreign residents in Peking are far beyond your imagination,’ he said.

The journey from Tientsin to Peking was no less difficult. He described its hardness in the Journey to Peking.3) ‘At 6 a.m. we reached Kanlintien, where the overflow of the Pai-ho hindered us from advancing any more. We could not help retreating some distance, and there I hired six natives to carry our loads. I could at last cross the overflowing stream by riding on the carriage tent. After that we had to go through the mud as deep as several feet or over a foot at the shallowest.... After entering the wall of Peking, we came to wider roads, but the wheels of the carriage were still in the mud. When we drove over the paved spots from time to time, the jolts were extremely horrible. The servants and the driver often paid attention to the back of the carriage. To my question they answered that they were apprehensive of having our loads stolen. It is astonishing that there should be those who steal on streets in the daytime, taking advantage of bumps of carriages.’ ‘The city (Peking) reminds us of the big scale of its past prosperous days, but today it is almost ruined and extremely filthy. There are few good houses except those of government officials and residences of officials. The conditions of roads are too miserable to describe.’

He suffered from inconvenience not only in daily life but also in correspondence which was indispensable for consular office. In winter when the Pai-ho froze and shipping service was stopped, communication with Japan could be possible by telegraph only. Correspondences took more than twenty days by land from Shanghai. After freezing of the river no mails by land arrived for a while, therefore no communications except telegrams were exchanged for nearly a month. It was during this time of the year that the Incident of 1884 in Seoul broke out and the consulate fell into an extreme embarrassment.8)

Now, what was Hara’s view of China in those days? His diary in the period is written quite briefly and the Reminiscences does not give us sufficient materials in this respect either, but I suppose that China as he pictured her in his mind was probably a huge, stagnant, and backward society, judging

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3) T. Hara, Reminiscences.
from the fact that he saw actual lives of Chinese people which were more backward than he had expected. Generally speaking, there was great diversity of views of China among Japanese people in this period. Although the image that China was a strong senior nation had gradually been fading since the end of Tokugawa era, yet still many Japanese seem to have valued her national power highly, together with their admiration for her traditional culture. On the other hand, however, with growing value set on Western civilization among the people, the consciousness that Japan was rapidly catching up to advanced nations outrunning China which still lagged far behind European countries seems to have been prevailing, especially among those bureaucrats who took the leadership in Japan's policy for civilization. What Hara experienced in China at the above-mentioned age is probably a very important factor of making his opinions on China. It may also have been the ground on which he proposed a strong policy in regard to the Seoul Incident of 1884.4)

Although Hara studied Chinese learning in his boyhood and had general knowledge of it, he turned to European education afterward, and felt no particular interest in Chinese classics. He was against Japanese diplomats having 'literary friendship' with Chinese high officials on the ground of its depreciating ourselves. His interests in those days are expressed in Journey to Peking in which he chiefly mentioned the bad state of roads and public disorder of Peking, scarcely touching its cultural inheritances.

II

In September 1897 Hara resigned the Foreign Ministry soon after the establishment of the Ohkuma-Itagaki Cabinet, and was requested to join the Osaka Mainichi Newspapers, where he worked for three years till he became a member of Seiyukai Party in September 1900. It was the period when China underwent many hardships both inside and outside, such as the occupation of Kiaochow Bay by Germany, the offer of lease of territory to Germany, Britain, and France, and the Boxer Rebellion. It was also the time when China was remarkably falling in the estimation of the general public in Japan as a result of its victory in the Sino-Japanese War. During those years Hara published not a few articles on China in the Osaka Mainichi, of which On China (Ching) was the

4) Dai-nippon Gaiko Monjo vol. 18, p. 195.
most representative one.

On China appeared in the Osaka Mainichi from 20th March to 3rd April in 1899, just before the Boxer Rebellion broke out. It consists of 'General Remarks', 'The Past of China,' 'Relation between Government and People', 'Present China', 'Future of China', 'Preservation of China's Territorial Integrity and Its Partition', and 'Policy to China'. I want to introduce the article hereunder.

To begin with, Hara takes up the fact that Japanese people know very little of Chinese state of affairs. 'Japanese culture had its source in China.... Therefore we have known the nation for a long time and we ought to have known her state of things very well. The fact is, however, the opposite. What we have learned from the classics is a little knowledge of the ancient China and it is of no use for studying her present circumstances.' In effect, we imported literature alone before the Restoration of 1868 and scarcely any information regarding China was obtained. Then, how was the case after the Restoration? 'As to other countries we have come to know fairly well as the results of importing the Western things and culture urgently and earnestly, but regarding China we are still remaining ignorant of it.' That is why we have been thrown into confusion at every event and unable to take proper measures for it. As for Korea, our experiences for these years have given us a fairly good knowledge of the nation, but as to China our wrong ideas of it have not been corrected yet even after the War, he says. Indeed, the national leaders in Meiji era mainly looked toward European countries and The United States and failed to pay proper attention to Asian countries. He points out this problem first of all.

The principle of Chinese politics in the past was, in Hara's words, to follow the examples of the ancient wise kings in domestic affairs and to take conciliatory measures to all the foreign peoples in regarding them as barbarians. As they still stick to this conventional policy, they cannot take an opportunity to renew their domestic administration or foreign relations. China’s domestic administration is not such as to be called oppression or tyranny. The government and the people have nothing to do with each other. The government neither benefit the people nor damage them, nor do the people rely on their government. Both of them have various kinds of self-governing bodies of their own. The senior or junior governor of each province, as if he were an independent contractor for the government of his province, is only required to pay the surplus of the revenue to the central government. Therefore, each of the eighteen provinces governs itself independently. Under the senior or junior governors every mayor,
chief or head has his own self-governing body. On the people's side, too, they organize co-operations according to areas and/or occupations and administrate themselves independent of their government. There is no unified political power ruling over the whole country, nor are the political ordinances integrated. This is one of the causes which renders it difficult for China to recover herself.

Next he treats of China's present situation, especially the occupation by European nations. After the Sino-Japanese War these powers have advanced into China so rapidly that greater part of her coast is brought under their control. Even if there had not been the War, she could not have avoided today's destiny. 'In former days European countries found North and South America and established their colonies there, and next took great notice of Africa to gain new colonies, whereas toward the East they only intended to develop their foreign trade, excepting India's case. But recently their attitudes have altered. It has become the fashion to occupy the main points of Chinese territory, besides the development of trade. Their way of doing is just the same as they took when they asked for colonies in America and Africa. It is almost impossible to anticipate what districts will be occupied by what nations hereafter.'

In spite of China's situation being such, her domestic administration would not improve at all. A few persons advocate reformation, but it is impossible to change the conventional system completely. 'China is still what she has been. Whether their districts are occupied by other nations or they are oppressed by other powers, they can not do anything but remain as they have been.' Recently some governors are planning to send students to Japan and to civilize their country by imitating her. It is a question whether this plan will be successful. And, even if it is successful, the reformation can only be achieved in respective provinces independently, and it will be almost impossible to make the whole country prosperous. After all 'the government will still remain as it has been, and the people will be as conventional as before. The people are not concerned with what lands may be taken by foreign countries nor with the government falling into distress. They do not worry themselves.' Indeed China has been a little civilized after opening diplomatic intercourse with Euramerican countries, in imitation of their systems, but this is nothing but a natural consequence irrespective of her intention. The Western civilization and culture will not prevail in this country to renew her old culture. On the contrary, she is being deprived of her lands, compelled to pay indemnities, and oppressed day by day. The external
affairs will not stimulate her progress.

When China's domestic and foreign affairs are such, what will become of her future? Apart from her distant future, she will not be able to make progress toward reformation stirred up by the external oppression in the near future, though she will not be extinguished in a short time, either. Other nations may be able to occupy some important points but unable to partition the whole territory. Because, there exists the international balance of power among them and their national powers are not so strong yet respectively. They touch China under the conditions of their diplomatic relations in Europe and of their own internal state of things. They can bring their power into this country in the line of trade relations, but not in the line of political relations.

Then, what should be our policy toward China in the near future? Hara criticizes the two competing arguments then advanced in Japan — one is for the preservation of the territorial integrity of China and the other for the partition of it. As to the preservation, the method for it is not mentioned clearly. If it means that the territory should be preserved as it is now, we must prevent any nation that should advance more or intend to obtain new occupation. But this is absolutely impossible to us. If the preservation means the complete integrity of the territory before the occupations by the foreign nations we, as well as the other nations, must resign what we have obtained. This is also impossible. After all the preservation of China's territorial integrity is 'nothing but a vague and empty theory.'

The partition of China probably means dividing her territory among nations. Such a plan, however, is not feasible in the prevailing international context. In fact, none of these nations — Russia, England, Germany, France, and others — reveals such a plot. The reason is not only that the matter is quite dangerous but also that the nations will not easily come to agreement for it, as already seen in the case of the partition of Poland. Besides, if once a nation should reveal the plan, she must be prepared to take any means to pursue it even combatting with others in case they are against it. Such a matter is not necessary, at least today, and no nation has enough power to maintain the land which is obtained in this way. I have never heard other nations speak of the partition of China, excepting mere rumours. Therefore, isn't it a sheer nonsense that Japan alone should decide such a plan?

Then, what policy should we take toward China? Japan and China are bound to stand and fall together. It is not desirable at all that China should
become weaker under pressure of other powers, much less so that she should be destroyed. But nothing could be done about the general state of things in China. It is desirable for us to help her progress, but we must never forget to consider our rights and benefits first — this is the most important point in foreign policy. The above-mentioned two arguments do not absolutely neglect our rights and benefits, but neither of them is argued from this point of view.

What are our actual rights and benefits in China? Among many things to be considered, the south is the land which has the deepest concern with us. To rule Taiwan perfectly and maintain her security, and to prevent other nations’ cession of Fukien Province on the opposite shore of Taiwan — this is the policy that we should adopt for the sake of our self-defence.

I have remarked a little too much about On China, I should like, however, to summarize it here. The most important points of the article are: firstly Hara looked upon Chinese politics and society to be very stagnant. Their conventional principle — to follow the examples of the ancient wise kings in domestic administration and to regard foreigners as barbarians — and their social system causing impossibility of establishing a unified political power made it very difficult for them to reform their country. Although there were some progressive Chinese who were endeavouring at reformation activities, Hara did not expect their effects. The revolutionary movement led by Sun Yet-sen which began in the south some years before did not come into his notice yet. In short, he was very sceptical about possibilities of reformation or revolution arising from the inside of China. ‘Whether they are oppressed by other nations, or some governors plan reformation, the country will not be greatly reformed. It can not be expected that a large revolution would change the country completely.’

Secondly, Hara noticed that the Western nations not only advanced rapidly and widely into China after the Sino-Japanese War, but also intended to occupy important points of the territory without being satisfied with trade expansion. He called such change of their attitude ‘fashion’ and identified it with their past colonialism in North and South Americas and Africa, (whereas it was the beginning of modern imperialism). Of course he realized that this tendency bore serious problems for the future of China, but he thought it impossible that the territory would be divided and occupied by the powers in the near future, because of the international balance of power and the limit of the power of each nation.

Thirdly, in respect to Japan’s future policy toward China, he criticized both arguments, or the preservation of territorial integrity of China and the partition
of it, calling them 'a vague and empty theory' and 'nonsense', and he insisted on
the maintenance of our actual rights and benefits — especially in the south —
which was the most important point in diplomacy. 'To forget our own rights
and benefits and run to righteous spirit, or to conceive an extraordinary ambi-
tion without considering our national power' will be very dangerous', so he
admonished.

His opinions on China around the end of 19th century are also expressed in
some of his other articles and lectures as well as in the above-mentioned On
China. They are fundamentally not so different from what I have already men-
tioned above. But I should like to take up some of the main ones in order to
supplement the above, as they are treated from somewhat different viewpoints.

In On China Hara remarked that China's weakness was not desirable at all,
but that her general tendency could not be helped. Before this, he wrote more
clearly on this matter in The Kiaochow Bay Incident and Policies toward China
issued just after Germany's occupation of the bay (Dec. 6, 1897, the Osaka Mainichi).
'The three (i.e. Germany, France and Russia) and Britain have no respect for
China any longer.... In case any of them can take an opportunity, she will put
her policy into practice at once. Now, how about our country? We have
trapped down the country in the War. We should realize that China is neither
a formidable enemy nor a trustworthy friend' He stressed the importance
of reconsidering our policy to China, by pointing out that a weak enemy will
not make a good friend to cooperate with. He also emphasized in his article
January 1st (Jan. 1, 1899 in the Osaka Mainichi) that the weakness and interior
insecurity of China, as well as the poor state of affairs of Korea and the Philip-
pines, made it difficult to maintain a long peace in the East. 'Especially as to
the East, Korea would not improve her old aspects at all; China is getting
worse day by day, Lushun and Talien being occupied by Russia, Weihaiwei by
Britain, and Kiao-chow Bay by Germany, besides the railway problems, the
riot in Peking, and unrest in the south; and the Philippines have not settled
down yet, either. We can not help saying that no constant peace will be attai-
ned in future any more than in the year before last.'

Thus Hara felt critical about the future of China, but he did not think that
Japan should take armed diplomacy immediately. His article Indemnity by
China (Mar. 4–5, 1898) objected against an opinion that the troops should remain
stationed at Weihaiwei even after the complete payment of China's indemnity.
He insisted that modern diplomacy should not ignore the principles of inter-
nationallaw. 'Some people believe that international law, as a matter of private opinion of scholars, has no validity in practical diplomacy, but I know that it is not so much ineffective in today's diplomacy.... Not all of the trouble among nations have been solved by interventional law so far, as there is no court for it in the world, although its progress nowadays is so much remarkable as was never imagined in the past, and sometimes the troubles have unfortunately been settled by force. But this does not justify the disregard of the law at all.' Some persons reproached Germany for her occupation of Kiaochow Bay as an extreme violence, but even Germany could not use violence outrageously in today's world, especially toward China whom every nation never failed to give attention to, he said. Germany explained it to be a warning to China's future attitude, which, he said, could be admitted in accordance with the law of nations 'in respect of the principle, though not in respect of the method' and he advised that we should respect international law all the more, for even Germany could not ignore it in that incident. His diplomatic career for more than ten years brought him into contact with the world where international law prevailed and he had experienced directly the European way of diplomacy in the 19th century, especially during his four years' residence in Paris. His words 'The progress of the international law nowadays is so much remarkable as was never imagined in the past' do not appear to be an exaggeration, judging from his own experience.

Then, what policy did Hara hold toward China? He looked upon the fundamental tendency of the modern societies as competition. His article Preparation for Execution of the New Treaty (Dec. 1, 1897–Jan. 23, 1898) says as follows: 'Those who are afraid of competition can not succeed in today's world. Even individuals are already under this condition, to say nothing of our nation which has been open to diplomatic intercourse for 33 years. Without courage to compete with our rivals in the world, how could we establish our nation? Therefore I want the government and the people to advance our competitive spirit more and more until we become equal to the rivals.' In July 1899 he was invited to the Assembly of Business Men in Kagawa Prefecture to give a lecture entitled The Way We Should Advance, in which he treated the question what ideas we should have of foreign things at the time when the new treaty was to be executed in a few days, and he repeated the importance of competition with foreign countries, especially 'business competition,' 'The people who are thoughtful of foreign affairs are such as never fail to study things and events occurring at every moment
— how to deal with foreign countries, or what to do with external influence we receive.... To think of foreign affairs is greatly different from regarding other nations as enemies. In short, it means competition with other nations. With good diplomatic ideas, what we should do is to compete with others in the field of both politics and business. Especially business competition is a matter of greater concern. As for the progress of a nation...if it is based on the industrial development, which is always in competition with rivals, we can expand our national power only when we have overcome our rivals in this field.' The above quotation is not particularly concerned with Chinese affairs, but it tells us at any rate his way of thinking in this period. In *Rioters in China* (June 9–10, 1900) written just after the event of the Boxer Rebellion, he mentioned that the Boxers were extraordinarily strong antialienists and would not be easily suppressed. In case the government should be helpless, foreign forces would have to suppress them; if so, the matter would affect a great deal not only the future of China but also that of the East. And his next article *China's Incident* (June 15–19, 1900) admonished simple arguments on China and advised to look upon the influence of this incident with a cool head. What he put the greatest importance on was how much the business world of China was disturbed by this incident and how much our trade with China would be affected. He also contended, in *Japano-Chinese Trade after the War* (July 3, 1900), that we should not think the trade hopeless even though the incident should unfortunately grow larger. ‘Good comes out of evil. We are not hopeless of making progress in Japano-Chinese trade after the War. Our business men should particularly bear this in mind’, so he concluded. It is clear that how much importance Hara put on the problem of ‘business’, especially on the trade with China in the period around 1900. Needless to say, the rapid development of Japan’s economy and the expansion of trade with China after the War were the bases of his arguments.

I think it necessary to touch the following point here. In those days Hara often dealt with the question what ideas we should have of foreign affairs in other articles of his. It should not be neglected, as it is mainly posed with a view to criticizing such arguments regarding China as the preservation, supporting, and partition of China.

Hara compared Japan which had advanced after examples of developed nations with non-advanced countries (China, Korea, Turkey, Egypt, Persia, etc.) and attributed the difference to the degree of ‘national awakening’ and ‘national progressive spirit’. He emphasized that a good knowledge of foreign
affairs was 'the most necessary thing both in politics and business', but at the same time he doubted the opinion that 'Japanese people are generally poor in diplomatic thought, and so, we must try to cultivate it'. The opinion was certainly reasonable to some extent because we could not keep a good position in the world without a good diplomatic knowledge, 'but,' he said, 'the word diplomacy seems to be used in a wrong sense in general. Diplomacy can not be really understood by common people. For instance, consuls and/or ministers must be sent to various countries in the world; we must be well-informed of the state of their resident countries by all means; as soon as we have received a telegram, we must take measures for it immediately; when we let our representatives abroad open negotiations with foreign countries, we must give instructions to them at every hour and moment.' That explains the reason why Hara thought diplomacy beyond the comprehension of the people in general who had nothing to do with diplomatic routine.

What on earth is diplomatic thought? He questioned in Diplomatic Thought (Aug. 29, 1900) about the admonition given by 'pretended scholars and politicians' that the people should have diplomatic thought. He said as follows: Some persons consider such 'vague arguments' regarding China to be diplomatic thought, while others think of 'actual tactics'. Those are, of course, included in diplomacy, but it is impossible to let the general people hold such thought. The diplomatic thought that the general people should have must be such as can be understood by everybody with his common sense. For example, in concluding treaties we can not ignore the other party's intention; the rights of the independent nations are equal to each other irrespective of scale of the countries concerned, but as a matter of fact differences of power can never be neglected, etc. ---. In short, the diplomatic thought he expected the general people to hold was that which they could understand with their common sense.

For the above-mentioned reasons, Hara did not want 'the vague arguments' on China to be popularized among the people. 'The partition of China's territory or the supporting for the nation may be permitted as mere discussions, but they can not be published as policies of our country. These questions should be treated with in actual situations and should not be announced in advance only to enable other nations prepare for them.' (China Incident) Nor could he approve of imprudent militarism. 'I can not agree with those who say that we should be the master of the East or we must not be behind other nations, as we hold navy power of 20,000 tons and 50,000 army soldiers to be used in such an occasion like this.
I don’t think it a suitable behaviour of a big nation to run to a temporary gallantry impatiently.’ (ibid.) We must always bear in mind that international affairs should not be discussed from the same viewpoint as in domestic affairs. Discussions absolutely neglecting external circumstances may be theoretically interesting, but they are often dangerous for practical purposes. Considering the history of discussions regarding Japan’s foreign policies since the end of Taku-gawa era, we realize that we had to suffer many difficulties in practical diplomatic negotiations owing to several anti-alien doctrines having been published thoughtlessly. (Discussions on Foreign Policy, July 2, 1900).

In Future Diplomacy (June 1, 1899) he says as follows: When we discuss foreign affairs, we must be fully prudent and ‘minute’, otherwise it is useless. Then, is there any particular and happy idea in our policy? The answer is “No”. The fundamental policy in foreign affairs is common to almost all the nations today — that is, ‘to secure our own rights and benefits and to expand them at any possible opportunities.’ For that purpose we must take positive measures, negative measures, and mixed ones, according to situations changing all the time. That is why diplomacy is difficult. You may laugh and say that if diplomacy is such a thing, it is as plain and simple as everyone knows. The fact is, however, that many people are giving arguments without understanding even this simple principle.

Professor Akira Irie states in his Japan’s Foreign Policy that it is a large characteristic throughout the modern history of Japan that the leaders of Japan’s foreign policy always dealt with problems in concern practically without being influenced by abstract thought or moralistic consciousness, and that the government’s realism in this sense and civilians’ idealism were always opposed to each other.1) Certainly, Japan’s foreign policy since the beginning of Meiji era had a realistic character, whose fundamental doctrine was ‘to secure our own rights and benefits and to expand them at any possible opportunities’. Such attitude of the government and the civilians’ opposition to it are most clearly seen in Chinese affairs. The government concentrated on gaining larger benefits from the continent step by step, following the examples of European countries and the United States. On the other hand, civilians emphasized the particularity of the Japano-Chinese relations, considering the distinction between the East and the West, although their arguments were full of variety; for example, some

1) Akira Irie, Nippon no Gaiko (Japan’s Foreign Policy), 1966.
people insisted on the Japano-Chinese coalition which intended to preserve China and establish the peace in Asia by the co-operation of the two, and others advocated Japan's becoming the leader of Asia by taking absolutely positive actions toward the weakened China.

As already mentioned, Hara always looked upon foreign policy from the practical standpoint, therefore, such idealism was, to his thinking, nothing but 'academic theories' or 'vague arguments'. They were rather daydreams than ideals, having nothing to do with reality. But if he had been able to have a much longer foresight of the reality of China, full of various possibilities, instead of regarding it as a fixed one, he could have thought the Japano-Chinese coalitionism to be more than a daydream. In China there were already reformists moving actively and even revolutionists began to act. In such a period Hara was still holding an idea that 'it can never be imagined that a big revolution would change China completely.' His 'realism' like this was to be unavoidably pushed away by the reality itself in due course.

(continued)