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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Ohtsubo, Yohsuke</td>
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Does Financial Compensation Need to Be Accompanied by Verbal Apologies?

Yohsuke Ohtsubo
(Kobe University)

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All data sets and R codes in the R Markdown HTML format are available from the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/98bta/).

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*Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*
Abstract

In intergroup conflicts, offers of financial compensation may be perceived as insulting by recipient groups and could exacerbate the conflicts. However, some scholars consider that it rather enhances the positive effects of political apologies. To test the effects of offers of apology, compensation, and apology + compensation, this study investigated how Japanese people would react to hypothetical peace deals concerning a real territorial dispute in which Japan is currently involved. Pilot Study (apology vs. compensation vs. control) revealed that Japanese participants more favorably reacted to the scenario when it described the other country offering an apology as opposed to offering compensation. In the main study, which employed a 2 (apology: present vs. absent) × 2 (compensation: present vs. absent) factorial design, Japanese participants more favorably reacted to the hypothetical deal in the apology/compensation condition than in the no apology/compensation and no apology/no compensation conditions.

Keywords: financial compensation, political apology, conflict resolution, reconciliation

Public Significance Statements

Offers of compensation might be perceived as insulting in the context of intergroup conflicts. However, the findings of this brief study suggest that there is possibility that financial compensation can elicit favorable responses if accompanied by apologies.
International disputes may conceivably be resolved by political apologies entailing financial compensation. As Minow (2002) stated, “reparations without apologies seem inauthentic, and apologies without reparations seem cheap” (p. 23). Consistent with Minow’s statement, it has been shown that the combination of apology and compensation (i.e., a form of costly apologies) is effective in laboratory settings (e.g., Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). However, making material reparations may exacerbate political conflicts. For example, in Ginges, Atran, Medin, and Shikaki’s (2007) vignette study conducted in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, moral absolutists, who were morally committed to sovereignty over their land, responded furiously to a hypothetical peace deal involving financial incentives (i.e., receiving some financial compensation in exchange for abandoning their land). Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, and Brown (2008) showed that reparations from outgroups could be perceived as insulting especially when the reparations entail the perpetrator group’s expression of guilt, which is a core component of intergroup apologies (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2008). Thus, in contrast to the evidence indicating the effectiveness of costly apologies, Ginges et al.’s and Giner-Sorolla et al.’s findings jointly suggest that offering an apology and compensation together would not facilitate reconciliation. To our knowledge, no studies have systematically tested these contradictory predictions (an exception is Blatz’s dissertation cited in Blatz et al., 2008).

To test the above predictions, we wrote hypothetical peace deal scenarios associated with a territorial dispute in which Japan is currently involved: the dispute with South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks. The Liancourt Rocks are uninhabited islands located in the Sea of Japan. Both Japan and South Korea claim the islands as their sovereign possession, although South Korea currently controls them. We do not explain this dispute in depth because the primary
The purpose of this study was to test the effectiveness of compensation, but not to explore possible solutions to this particular dispute (for a succinct English summary of this dispute, see “Profile: Dokdo/Takeshima Islands,” 2012). In this study, Japanese participants reported their attitudes toward the hypothetical peace deal in one of the experimental conditions. Pilot Study, which included the apology, compensation, and control (i.e., neither apology nor compensation was described) conditions, confirmed that participants more favorably reacted to the deal including the other country’s apology than the deal involving compensation. The main study employed a 2 (apology: present vs. absent) × 2 (compensation: present vs. absent) factorial design to test the effect of the combination of apology and compensation on people’s attitudes toward the deal. (Due to limitations of space, there are unreported details of the pilot and main studies, which can be found in the Supplementary Materials.)

**Pilot Study**

Pilot Study (conducted in March, 2016) involved 600 participants (217 females and 383 males, mean age ± SD = 46.30 ± 11.85 years). They were recruited through an online survey service provided by Cross Marketing Inc., Japan. Participants imagined that a hypothetical peace deal involving both sides’ significant compromises over the Liancourt Rocks dispute was under consideration to avoid a serious armed clash with South Korea. The scenario described co-management of the islands with South Korea (for the notion of co-management, see Ohtsubo, 2019). In the apology condition, the scenario was followed by the sentence, “In exchange for Japan approving the deal, South Korea will publicly apologize.” In the compensation condition, the scenario was followed by the sentence, “In exchange for Japan approving the deal, South Korea will pay one trillion Japanese yen as compensation.” The extremely large compensation amount was chosen to maximize the incentive to support the deal. In the control condition, the
scenario simply ended with the deal. Participants then rated their level of support, estimate of the proportion of Japanese citizens who would support this deal, and estimate of the probability of this deal’s success using a 101-point scale (0–100). The responses to the three items were mutually highly correlated ($r > .66$ and Cronbach’s $\alpha = .87$) and thus aggregated as the single score indicating participants’ favorable reaction to the hypothetical peace deal.

The favorable reaction score was submitted to a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The main effect of the condition was significant, $F(2, 597) = 5.58, p = .004, \eta^2_p = .019$ (see Figure 1 for the distribution, mean, and median of the favorable reaction as a function of the conditions). A series of post hoc tests showed that favorable reaction was significantly higher in the apology condition (33.04 ± 24.64) than in the control (27.27 ± 24.43) and compensation (25.34 ± 22.88) conditions. Thus, participants reacted more favorably to the peace deal entailing an apology than to financial compensation. This result was confirmed by another pilot study using a different territorial dispute (i.e., the northern territories dispute between Japan and Russia). This study is reported in Supplementary Materials.

Main Study

Methods

The main study was conducted in November, 2016. For this study, 1,600 participants (800 men and 800 women) were recruited through an online survey service provided by Cross Marketing Inc., Japan. They ranged in age from 20 to 80 years (mean ± SD was 46.00 ± 14.09 years). The main study employed a 2 (apology: present vs. absent) × 2 (compensation: present vs. absent) between-participants factorial design. The three favorable reaction items were mutually highly correlated ($r > .56$) and thus aggregated as a single score indicating a favorable reaction to the hypothetical peace deal (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .83$).
Results

The favorable reaction score was submitted to a 2 (apology) × 2 (compensation) ANOVA (see Table 1). The main effect of apology, $F(1, 1596) = 22.99, p = 1.78 \times 10^{-6}, \eta_{p}^2 = 0.014$, and the interaction between apology and compensation, $F(1, 1596) = 7.54, p = .006, \eta_{p}^2 = 0.005$, were significant. The distribution, mean, and median of favorable reaction as a function of apology and compensation are shown in Figure 2. Although the effect size of the apology × compensation interaction effect was rather small, Figure 2 indicates that the pattern was consistent with Minow’s (2002) prediction. The combination of apology and compensation was associated with the highest favorable reaction score ($M \pm SD = 33.99 \pm 23.20$), which was significantly greater than the favorable reaction in the no apology/compensation ($25.35 \pm 22.18, p < .001$) and no apology/no compensation ($28.11 \pm 22.81, p = .002$) conditions according to Tukey’s HSD test. In addition, confirming the results of Pilot Study, favorable reaction was higher in the apology/no compensation condition ($30.44 \pm 23.60$) than in the no apology/compensation condition ($25.35, p = .009$) according to Tukey’s HSD test. No other post hoc comparisons reached statistical significance.

Discussion

The present experimental study uncovered that although people would find the offer of compensation alone unacceptable, they would favorably react to it if it was combined with an apology. This is consistent with Minow’s (2002) insight. Beyond this main finding, it is noteworthy that the violin plots in Figures 1 and 2 exhibit bimodal distributions. The lower modes suggest the presence of a group of strong opponents to the peace deal, and the upper modes (around 50) suggest the presence of a moderately supportive group. Whether this difference may be accounted for by commitment to sovereignty over the islands (Ginges et al.,
2007) requires more careful scrutiny (see Supplementary Materials).

This study had several limitations. The first limitation was its exclusive focus on Japanese participants. It would be feasible to conduct the same research, for example, in South Korea by flipping the positions—Japan apologizes to South Korea for unjustly claiming its sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks. Second, somewhat related to the first limitation, the study lacked external validity (e.g., representative samples were not chosen; the hypothetical peace deal scenario was not necessarily realistic). However, it is worth emphasizing that a parallel pattern was found in the interpersonal apology context (e.g., Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that the favorable reaction to the offer of compensation entailing an apology may be generalizable to other intergroup conflict contexts and populations. Third, the study did not include intergroup forgiveness, which is considered one of the most important outcome variables in the literature (e.g., Hornsey & Wohl, 2013). This was because territorial disputes do not include obvious victims (i.e., both sides claim the legitimacy of their sovereignty) and, thus, are not amenable to the notion of forgiveness. For the same reason, this study failed to address another important issue in the literature—namely, the psychology of victimhood (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009). In future studies, it is worth investigating whether an apology could also enhance the effect of the offer of compensation in contexts involving victims of human rights violations.
References


Ohtsubo, Y., & Watanabe, E. (2009). Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly
signaling model of apology. *Evolution and Human Behavior, 30*(2), 114-123.


Table 1

*Results of a 2 (Apology) × 2 (compensation) ANOVA*

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Figure Captions

**Figure 1.** Violin plot combined with boxplot showing the distribution, mean, and median of the favorable reaction score as a function of the condition (apology vs. control vs. compensation). Within the boxplot, the dot indicates the mean and the horizontal bar, the median.

**Figure 2.** Violin plots combined with boxplots showing the distribution, mean, and median of the favorable reaction score as a function of apology (present vs. absent) and compensation (present vs. absent). Within each boxplot, the dot indicates the mean and the horizontal bar, the median. The left panel shows the results of the no compensation condition and the right panel shows those of the compensation condition. The white graphs correspond to the no apology condition and the gray graphs, the apology condition.
Favorable Reaction to the Peace Deal

Apology

Control

Compensation
Favorable Reaction to the Peace Deal

Apology
• No Apology
• Apology

No Compensation
Compensation
Supplementary Materials

Does Financial Compensation Need to Be Accompanied by Verbal Apologies?

Pilot Study: Materials

Pilot Study: Results (Additional Analyses)

Main Results of the Northern Territories Study

Figure S1

Figure S2

Figure S3

Main Study: Method

Main Study: Results (Additional Analyses)

Commitment to the Liancourt Rocks

Non-significant Effect of Relationship Value Manipulation

Negative Emotions, Apology, Compensation, and Sacred Value

Favorable Reaction, Apology, Compensation, and Sacred Value

Figure S4

References

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Pilot Study: Materials

The pilot study in fact consisted of two separate studies: The Liancourt Rocks study (reported in the main text) and the northern territories study. The northern territories refer to four of the Kuril Islands. Although the Japanese government claims its sovereignty over the four islands, they are currently inhabited by Russians (see McKirdy, 2019). The northern territories study included a sample of 600 participants (266 females and 334 males, mean age \( \pm SD = 45.05 \pm 11.55 \) years). There was no overlap between the Liancourt Rocks study sample and the northern territories study sample. The northern territories study sample was also recruited.
Participants imagined that a hypothetical peace deal involving both sides’ significant compromises over the focal issue was under consideration to avoid a serious armed clash with the other country. The Liancourt Rocks scenario described co-management of the islands with South Korea (see Ohtsubo, 2019, for the notion of co-management). The northern territories scenario described Russia returning control over two of the four disputed islands to Japan (i.e., Japan would lose sovereignty over the other two islands).

The questionnaire of the pilot study consisted of the following sections: (1) Assessment of participants’ moral commitment to the disputed islands, (2) hypothetical peace deal scenario; (3) assessment of participants’ emotions about the peace deal, and (4) participants’ supportive attitudes toward the peace deal measured by three items: their own support for the peace deal, estimate of the proportion of Japanese citizens who support it, and estimate of the deal’s probability of success. The main text reports only the fourth section variables. The items in the first and third sections were adapted from Ginges, Atran, Medin, and Shikaki’s (2007) study. The first section asked participants the following question: “Considering every possible situation, are there any extreme situations in which Japan would have no choice other than to abandon sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks [the northern territories] and hand them over to South Korea [Russia]?” Participants answered this item with dichotomous alternatives of either “yes” or “no.” Those who chose “no” were considered moral absolutists.

The second section involved the experimental manipulation. Participants read one of the three hypothetical peace deal scenarios. In the Liancourt Rocks study, the scenario read “To
avoid an armed clash over the Liancourt Rocks, the islands will be co-managed by Japan and South Korea.” In the control condition, participants read only this sentence. In the apology condition, the co-management scenario was followed by “In exchange for Japan approving the co-management, South Korea publicly apologizes to Japan for having unjustly controlled the Liancourt Rocks since 1953.” In the compensation condition, the original sentence was followed by “In exchange for Japan approving the co-management, South Korea pays one trillion Japanese yen to Japan as financial compensation.” In the northern territories study, the scenario read, “To avoid an armed clash over the northern territories dispute, Shikotan and Habomai Islands are returned to Japan and Kunashir and Iturup formally belong to Russia.” In the control condition, participants read only this sentence. In the apology condition, this sentence was followed by “In exchange for Japan approving Russia’s sovereignty over Kunashir and Iturup, Russia publicly apologizes to Japan for not having returned the two islands [Shikotan and Habomai Islands] that have not belonged to the Kurile Islands since the Treaty of San Francisco was ratified.” In the compensation condition, the original sentence was followed by “In exchange for Japan approving Russia’s sovereignty over Kunashir and Iturup, Russia pays one trillion Japanese yen to Japan as financial compensation.”

In the third section, participants were asked the following question: “If the Japanese prime minister were to sign this peace treaty, how would you feel?” Participants chose one from the following five options: pity, disgust, approval, anger, and nothing in particular. Following Ginges et al. (2007), the choice of either disgust or anger was coded as a negative emotional reaction. In the fourth section, participants responded to the three items reported in the main text. The three items asked about participants’ support for the peace deal, estimate of the proportion of
Japanese citizens who support the deal, and estimate of the deal’s probability of success on a 101-point scale (0 to 100).

**Pilot Study: Results (Additional Analyses)**

*Main Results of the Northern Territories Study*

In the main text, we only report the results of the Liancourt Rocks study. We first report the comparable analyses of the northern territories study data. The responses to the three items (in the fourth section) were mutually highly correlated \((rs > .57\) and Cronbach’s \(\alpha = .82\)) and thus aggregated as the single score indicating participants’ favorable reaction to the hypothetical peace deal.

The favorable reaction score was submitted to a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The main effect of the condition was significant, \(F(2, 597) = 5.28, p = .005, \eta^2_p = .018\) (see Figure S1 for the distribution, mean, and median of the favorable reaction as a function of the conditions; Figure S1 contains both the Liancourt Rocks data and the northern territories data to facilitate the comparison of the two studies). A series of post hoc tests showed that favorable reaction in the compensation condition (29.32 ± 21.44) was significantly lower than that in the apology condition (36.12 ± 20.84), but only marginally significantly lower \((p = .051)\) than that in the control condition (34.41 ± 22.99). Thus, the robust pattern (which is consistent with the results of the Liancourt Rocks study) was that Japanese participants reacted more favorably to the peace deal entailing an apology than to financial compensation.
Violin plots combined with boxplots showing the distribution, mean, and median of the favorable reaction score as a function of the condition (apology vs. control vs. compensation) for each scenario. The dot within each boxplot indicates the mean and the horizontal bar within each boxplot indicates the median.

Figure S1.
Commitment and Negative Emotions

We first examined how many participants were committed to Japan’s sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks and the northern territories. We found that 493 out of 600 participants (0.82) were committed to sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks (i.e., they considered that there would be no circumstances in which Japan should abandon its sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks) and 431 out of 600 participants (0.72) were committed to sovereignty over the northern territories.

Figure S2 shows the frequency of participants who would feel a negative emotion (either anger or disgust) in response to imagining the Japanese prime minister signing the peace deal as a function of the condition and commitment. Two separate general linear models were used to analyze these data. The dependent variable was the dummy coded negative emotion (0 = “neither angry nor disgusted” and 1 = “angry or disgusted”). The apology and compensation conditions were represented by two dummy coded variables with the control condition as a baseline. General linear models included apology, compensation, commitment, apology × commitment interaction, and compensation × commitment interaction as the independent variables. For both the Liancourt Rocks and the northern territories scenarios, the effect of commitment was significant: $b = 1.18$ standard error ($SE$) = 0.43, $p = .006$ for the Liancourt Rocks scenario; $b = 0.85$, $SE = 0.34$, $p = .012$ for the northern territories scenario. As can be seen in Figure S1, in both scenarios, those who were committed to sovereignty over the respective islands (solid lines) reported negative emotions more frequently than did non-committed participants (broken lines). In addition, in the Liancourt Rocks scenario, the interaction between apology and commitment was significant, $b = -1.09$, $SE = 0.55$, $p = .047$. This effect is due to the smaller difference between the committed and non-committed participants in the apology
condition. However, we refrain from emphasizing this effect because a comparable pattern was not observed for the northern territories scenario. No other effects were statistically significant.

![Graph (a) Liancourt Rocks](image)

**Figure S2.** Relative frequency of those who would feel a negative emotion (either anger or disgust) toward the prime minister signing the peace deal as a function of the condition and commitment to sovereignty over (a) the Liancourt Rocks or (b) the northern territories.

**Commitment and Favorable Reaction to the Peace Deal**

A favorable reaction to the peace deal (i.e., the aggregated score of the three items regarding participants’ attitude toward the peace deal) was first submitted to a series of 3 (condition: control vs. apology vs. compensation) × 2 (gender) × 2 (commitment) ANOVAs. As shown in Table S1, in both scenarios, the main effect of gender and interaction effects involving gender were not significant. However, the main effect of gender was marginally significant in the Liancourt Rocks scenario, $M \pm SD = 27.51 \pm 25.15$ and $30.38 \pm 22.30$ for males and females, respectively. Female participants were slightly more favorable than male participants were to the Liancourt Rocks peace deal. The marginally significant interaction effect between the condition
and gender is due to the reversed favorability in the control condition: In the apology condition, females (38.76 ±20.61) were more favorable than males (30.70 ±25.81). In the compensation condition, females (29.03 ±20.79) were more favorable than males (22.88 ±23.94). However, in the control condition, males (28.37 ±25.06) were more favorable than females (25.59 ± 23.48), although the difference was negligible. We do not interpret these results because neither of the effects was significant. Moreover, comparable effects involving gender were not observed in the northern territories scenario.

Figure S3 shows the distribution of the favorable reaction to the peace deal by combining violin plots and boxplots. As can be seen in Figure S3, in both scenarios, non-committed participants (commitment = 0) were more favorable than committed participants (commitment = 1). The significant interaction between the condition and commitment in the Liancourt Rocks scenario is partly due to the very small difference between the committed and non-committed participants in the apology condition (the difference score = −0.14, ns, by Tukey’s HSD test) compared with the larger differences in the other conditions (the difference score was 11.74, $p = .106$ in the compensation condition and 16.54, $p = .006$ in the control condition). Since this effect was observed only in the Liancourt Rocks scenario, we refrain from emphasizing this interaction effect.
Table S1

*Results of 3 (Condition) × 2 (Gender) × 2 (Commitment) Factorial Design ANOVAs for the Liancourt Rocks Study (Upper Panel) and the Northern Territories Study (Lower Panel)*

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Figure S3

Violin plots combined with boxplots to show the distribution, mean, and median of the favorable reaction score as a function of the condition (apology vs. control vs. compensation) and commitment for each scenario. Within each boxplot, the dot indicates the mean and the horizontal bar, the median. White plots represent non-committed participants and gray plots, committed-participants.

Throughout the additional analyses, most importantly, the main effect of the condition was significant in each scenarios of the pilot study even when the effects of commitment and gender were statically controlled for. Therefore, the inclusion of the northern territories study and the inclusion of commitment to the disputed islands did not substantially moderate the results reported in the main text.
Main Study: Method

The main study employed the same materials as those of the Liancourt Rocks scenario of the pilot study, but it differed from the pilot study in three ways. (1) The most important difference was in the experimental condition. As stated in the main text, this main study employed a 2 (apology) × 2 (compensation) between-participants factorial design. Therefore, there were the following four conditions: the no apology/no compensation condition, the apology/no compensation condition, the no apology/compensation condition, and the apology/compensation condition.

(2) The relationship value (Ohtsubo, 2019) of South Korea was manipulated for an exploratory purpose. At the very beginning of the study, participants engaged in the relationship value manipulation task, which was purportedly a test of their knowledge of Japanese trading partners. There were two levels: high vs. low relationship value. All participants were asked to guess the top three countries from which Japan imports three commodities (e.g., metal products, petroleum products) and the top three countries to which Japan exports three commodities (e.g., steel, plastic). Once participants provided their answers for each commodity, they received the correct answers. In the high relationship value condition, South Korea was included in the top three countries for all six commodities. In the low relationship value condition, South Korea was not included in the top-three countries for any of the six commodities. As we report in the results section of this supplementary text, there was no significant effect of this manipulation. To strengthen this manipulation, Ohtsubo (2019) had participants not only receive the correct answers but also type those correct answers themselves by providing space on the feedback page. In Ohtsubo’s (2019) study, this manipulation successfully influenced participants’ valuation of South Korea. The failure of this manipulation in the study was thus presumably due to
participants’ insufficient attention to the correct answers. Therefore, in the main text, we do not mention this condition (and do not include it in the analyses).

(3) After the fourth section (i.e., three items assessing supportive attitude toward the deal), for an exploratory purpose, we included one more item asking about participants’ sense of guilt if Japan would decline to sign the peace deal. This was measured on a 7-point scale (1 = “do not feel guilty at all” to 7 = “feel very guilty”).

Main Study: Results (Additional Analyses)

Commitment to the Liancourt Rocks

We first checked how many participants were committed to sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks. The vast majority of participants (.86 = 1,335/1,600) were committed (i.e., they considered that there are no extreme circumstances in which Japan would abandon its sovereignty). This is almost comparable with the proportion of committed participants in the Liancourt Rocks pilot study (.82), \( p = .915 \) by Fisher’s exact test.

Non-significant Effect of Relationship Value Manipulation

We checked whether the relationship value manipulation had any effect on negative emotion, favorable reaction, and guilt. A negative emotion (either anger or disgust) was reported by 404 (of 800) and 408 (of 800) participants in the low and high relationship value conditions, respectively, \( \chi^2(df = 1) = .02, ns \). The mean favorable reaction to the peace deal was 29.76 ± 22.91 and 29.31 ± 23.42 in the low and high relationship value conditions, respectively, \( t(1598) = 0.39, ns \). Mean expected guilt (if Japan would decline to sign the peace deal) was 2.49 ± 1.61 and 2.54 ± 1.67 in the low and high relationship value conditions, respectively, \( t(1598) = 0.67, ns \). These results suggest that the relationship manipulation had almost no effect on the variables of
interest. Therefore, the analyses reported in the main text and the subsequent analyses in this supplementary document do not include relationship value.

**Negative Emotions, Apology, Compensation, and Sacred Value**

Negative emotion (dummy coded variable) was analyzed by a logistic regression analysis. It was regressed on commitment to the disputed islands, gender, apology, compensation, and apology × compensation interaction. The effects of commitment ($b = 1.21$, $SE = 0.15$, $p < .001$) and gender were significant ($b = 0.40$, $SE = 0.10$, $p < .001$). Of 265 non-committed participants, 73 (.28) reported anger or disgust, while of 1,335 committed participants, 739 (.55) reported anger or disgust. Of 800 female participants, 368 (.46) reported anger or disgust, while of 800 male participants, 444 (.56) reported anger or disgust. The effect of apology × compensation interaction was marginally significant ($b = -0.39$, $SE = 0.21$, $p = .058$). This marginally significant effect parallels the result reported in the main text. The relative frequency of participants who reported anger or disgust was .53 in the no apology/no compensation condition. The offer of compensation increased the frequency of negative emotion to .57, while the offer of apology decreased it to .49. The offer of apology and compensation reduced it to .45 (thus, it was most effective), although the effect was small. In a model including the interactions between the apology/compensation condition and commitment, those interactions were not significant.

**Favorable Reaction, Apology, Compensation, and Sacred Value**

The favorable reaction score was submitted to a 2 (apology) × 2 (compensation) × 2 (gender) × 2 (commitment) ANOVA. Consistent with the results reported in the main text, the main effect of apology ($F(1, 1584) = 24.87$, $p < .001$) and the interaction between apology and compensation ($F(1, 1584) = 9.39$, $p = .002$) were significant. In addition, the main effects of
gender ($F(1, 1584) = 20.52, \ p < .001$) and commitment ($F(1, 1584) = 108.49, \ p < .001$) were significant. Favorable reaction was higher among female participants (32.10 ± 22.52) than male participants (26.97 ± 23.53). However, it is premature to conclude that women tend to have a favorable reaction to peace deals because the effect of gender was not significant in either scenario of the pilot study. Consistent with the pilot study, non-committed participants (42.44 ± 21.79) were more favorable than committed participants (26.98 ± 22.57) to the peace deal.

Although the apology × compensation × commitment three-way interaction was significant ($F(1, 1584) = 4.52, \ p = .034$), as can be seen in Figure S4, the apology × compensation interaction pattern was not substantially modified by commitment (compare the left and right panels). The noticeable differences from the results reported in the main text are as follows: The difference between the apology/no compensation condition and the no apology/compensation condition became non-significant among the committed participants (difference score = 4.81, $p = .091$) and the non-committed participants (the difference score = 7.22, $p = .531$). The difference between the no apology/no compensation condition vs. the apology/compensation condition became non-significant among non-committed participants (the difference score = 7.09, $p = .620$) but it remained significant among committed participants (the difference score = 5.46, $p = .032$). One might wonder why the larger difference (7.09) was non-significant and the smaller difference (5.46) was significant. This is due to the difference in sample size: There were more committed participants (1,335) than non-committed participants (265). Nevertheless, the difference between the no apology/compensation condition and apology/compensation condition was significant among both committed (7.46, $p < .001$) and non-committed participants (15.81, $p < .001$). Therefore, although commitment slightly moderated the apology × compensation interaction, the
most important result (i.e., compensation was not effective in itself, but it was effective when combined with an apology) remained intact.

![Figure S4](image)

**Figure S4**

Violin plots combined with boxplots to show the distribution, mean, and median of the favorable reaction score as a function of apology (present vs. absent) and compensation (present vs. absent). Within each boxplot, the dot indicates the mean, and the horizontal bar, the median. The left panel shows the results of the non-committed participants and the right panel shows those of the committed participants. In each panel, the no apology/no compensation condition (nothing), the apology/no compensation condition (apology), the no apology/compensation condition (compensation), and the apology/compensation condition (both) are ordered from left to right.
Guilt, Apology, Compensation, and Sacred Value

In this study, participants were asked how guilty they would feel if the Japanese government were to decline to sign a peace deal. The guilt score was first submitted to a 2 (apology) × 2 (compensation) × 2 (gender) × 2 (commitment) ANOVA. Although the main effect of commitment was significant ($F(1, 1584) = 94.67, p < .001$; the non-committed participants reported greater guilt (3.38 ± 1.79) than the committed participants (2.35 ± 1.55)), no interaction effects involving commitment were significant. Accordingly, for the sake of simplicity, we will report the ANOVA results not including commitment in the independent variables. The main effects of apology ($F(1, 1592) = 6.48, p = .011$) and gender ($F(1, 1592) = 26.84, p < .001$) were significant. Female participants reported higher guilt (2.73 ± 1.58) than male participants (2.30 ± 1.68). The main effect of apology was qualified by the significant apology × compensation interaction ($F(1, 1592) = 5.42, p = .020$), which parallels the comparable interaction effect on a favorable reaction. When neither apology nor compensation was offered, mean guilt was 2.50 ± 1.65. When an apology was offered, the guilt score changed little (2.52 ± 1.68). When compensation was offered, the guilt score slightly decreased (2.32 ± 1.53). When both an apology and compensation were offered, the guilt score was highest (2.71 ± 1.68). Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests associated with a 2 (apology) × 2 (compensation) design revealed that the difference between the apology/compensation condition and the no apology/compensation condition was significant ($p = .003$), but any other post hoc contrasts reached statistical significance. Again, although the effect was weaker, this analysis confirmed the most important conclusion of the main text: The offer of compensation alone was least effective, while the offer of both an apology and compensation was most effective.
References

